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Since the be gin ning of the nu clear power gen er a tion, hu man per for mance has been a very im -
por tant fac tor in all phases of the plant lifecycle: de sign, com mis sion ing, op er a tion, main te -
nance, sur veil lance, mod i fi ca tion, and de com mis sion ing. This as pect has been con firmed by
the op er at ing ex pe ri ence. A work shop was or ga nized by the IAEA and the Joint Re search
Cen tre of the Eu ro pean Com mis sion, on Har mo ni za tion of low power and shutdown
probabilistic safety assessment for WWER nuclear power plants. One of the ma jor ob jec tives
of the Work shop was to pro vide a com par i son of the ap proaches and re sults of hu man re li abil -
ity anal y ses for WWER 440 and WWER 1000, and gain in sights for fu ture ap pli ca tion of hu -
man re li abil ity anal y ses in Low Power and Shut down sce nar ios. This pa per pro vides the in -
sights and con clu sions of the work shops con cern ing hu man re li abil ity anal y ses and hu man
fac tors.
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BACK GROUND
The risk cor re spond ing to Low Power and Shut -
down (LPSD) op er a tion of WWER NPP is com pa ra -
ble with the risk for at-power op er a tion or even may
ex ceed it, as pointed out by many PSA stud ies. Hu man
fac tors play a ma jor role in the LPSD op er a tions,
there fore the main con tri bu tors to the risk im plied by
the LPSD op er a tions are re lated to hu man fac tors. By
means of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA),
weak nesses re lated to hu man per for mance and hu man
fac tors can be iden ti fied and ap pro pri ate cor rec tive ac -
tions can be taken with the aim of fur ther en hanc ing
nu clear safety.
The hu man re li abil ity anal y sis of PSA for LPSD
states has to con sider spe cific fea tures that may be dif -
fer ent from those of the hu man re li abil ity anal y ses
(HRA) per formed for at-power PSA. These fea tures
may im pact both the op er a tors’ work and on the meth -
ods, and in clude: dif fer ent time win dows avail able for
op er a tors to mit i gate con se quences, the level of de tail
and com plete ness of the pro ce dures used dur ing shut -
down, more re quire ments for man ual ma nip u la tions
with plant equip ment in re sponse to ini ti at ing event
due to un avail abil ity of some emer gency in ter locks,
and very strong in ter ac tion be tween hu man-in duced
ini ti a tors and sub se quent op er a tor re sponse.
In 2007, the IAEA launched a Re gional tech ni -
cal co-op er a tion (TC) Pro ject RER9087 Har mo ni za -
tion of PSA & PSA Ap pli ca tions.  In the frame work
of the above pro ject, the IAEA or ga nized in co-op er a -
tion with the In sti tute for En ergy of the Joint Re -
search Cen ter of the Eu ro pean com mis sion (JRC-IE)
a work shop on Har mo ni za tion of Low Power and
Shut down Proba bil is tic Safety As sess ment for
WWER Nu clear Power Plants. One of the key top ics
was the anal y sis of the im pact of hu man fac tors on
NPP safety. In par tic u lar, the work shop, with spe cific
fo cus on hu man re li abil ity, aimed at con tin u ing the
work on har mo ni za tion of PSA for WWER-type nu -
clear power plants for LPSD states that was started at
the first work shop held at the same place in March
2007. More de tails con cern ing the re sults of the
work shops, and the dom i nant hu man er rors iden ti -
fied in the dif fer ent PSA re lated to WWER re ac tors
are given in the re ports of the work shops [1, 2] and in
a pre vi ous pa per of the au thors [3].
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METH OD OL OGY USED FOR
THE PSA STUDY
For col lect ing the data needed for the pur poses
of the Work shop, a ques tion naire was de vel oped and
sent to the par tic i pants. The ques tion naire aimed at
col lect ing de tailed in for ma tion on ini ti at ing events
fre quen cies, hu man er rors, and mod el ing de tails for
six se lected ini ti a tors for WWER-440 and
WWER-1000 plants. The se lected ini ti a tors rep re sent
the ma jor con tri bu tors to the core dam age fre quency
(CDF) in PSA stud ies for re spec tive WWER plant
units. These have been iden ti fied at the first work shop
[2]. The se lected ini ti a tors were:
WWER-440: WWER-1000:
(1) Human-induced loss of
.... coolant accident  
.....(LOCA)
(1) Loss of offsite power
......(LOOP)
(2) Loss of non-essential .... 
......service water
(2) Heavy load drops on 
......primary circuit (into the
......reactor)
(3) Reactivity accidents ... 
......including boron
/////dilution
(3) Primary circuit leaks outside 
......containment
(4) Loss of natural
......circulation
(4) Small LOCA from primary
......to secondary circuit
(5) Heavy load drops (5) Loss of heat removal from
......reactor core via primary side
(6) Small LOCA
     20-60 mm
(6) Primary leaks via pressurizer 
......safety valves after opening
......during hydrotest
Eleven com pleted ques tion naires were re ceived
form the par tic i pants rep re sent ing dif fer ent NPP as
pre sented in tab. 1.
The orig i nal re sponses can be found in An nex III 
of ref [1]. Dur ing the Work shop, the col lected data
were pro cessed in the PSA com par i son ac tiv i ties
which were car ried out by two work ing groups (WG):
– WG 1, which car ried out the com par i son and har mo -
ni za tion of LPSD PSA for WWER-440 NPP, and
– WG 2, which car ried out the com par i son and har -
mo ni za tion of LPSD PSA for WWER-1000 NPP.
For both groups of WWER NPP the fol low ing
in for ma tion was col lected for six ini ti a tors rec og nized
to be the ma jor source of dif fer ences in the risk pro -
files:
– con tri bu tion to the to tal CDF for the ini ti a tors
[1, 2],
– twenty TOP min i mal cut sets (MCSs)**, and
– human er rors (HE) mod eled.
Sev eral main ar eas of anal y sis were cov ered in
the dis cus sions car ried out in the work ing groups [1];
in par tic u lar, the achieve ment of in sights on re sults
and spe cific fea tures of Hu man Re li abil ity Anal y sis
for PSA for LPSD states. While do ing the com par i son
ex er cise, the de sign dif fer ences were an a lyzed and
taken into ac count, as well as the fact that the orig i nal
de signs were not iden ti cal.
OVER VIEW OF THE METH ODS
FOR THE HRA QUAN TI FI CA TION 
Dur ing the work shop, the em pha sis was put on
the com par i son of the meth od ol o gies used for hu man
re li abil ity anal y sis in the LPSD PSAs for WWER-440
NPPs, in par tic u lar for what con cerns the quan ti fi ca -
tion of the prob a bil ity of oc cur rence of hu man fail ure
events. An over view of the meth od ol o gies is pre -
sented in tab. 2 (Ad di tional in for ma tion con cern ing
the ta ble can be found in ref er ence 1).
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Ta ble 1. Over view of Plants Con trib ut ing to the Ques tion naire
on LPSD PSA
Country Plant Basic design
WWER-1000 NPP
Bulgaria Kozloduy NPP units 5, 6 V-320
Russia Kalinin NPP unit 2 V-338 (small series)
Russia Novovoronezh NPP unit 5 V-187 (small series)
Ukraine Rivne NPP unit 4 V-320
Ukraine Khmelnytsky NPP unit 2 V-320
WWER-440 NPP
Bulgaria Kozloduy NPP units 3, 4*
V-209M
Upgraded model of
V-230
Czech
republic Dukovany NPP unit 1 V-213
Hungary Paks NPP units 1-4 V-213
Slovakia Bohunice V-1 unit 2 V-230
Slovakia Bohunice V-2 unit 3 V-213
Slovakia Mochovce NPP unit 1 V-213
*The plant units are shut down of De cem ber 31, 2006
**A min i mal cut set is a com bi na tion of an ini ti at ing event and com -
po nent fail ures and/or hu man er rors that could lead to un de sir able
con se quences (e. g. core dam age). It means that: (1) the given
com bi na tion of events would cause core dam age, and (2) if any
event is se lected and elim i nated from the min i mum cut set, the re -
main ing sub set of events does not cause core dam age any more.
Each MCS has a fre quency as sessed by PSA tech nique.
Ta ble 2. Meth od ol o gies used for anal y sis and quan ti fi ca tion 
of hu man er ror prob a bil ity (HEP) for the in di vid ual
cat e go ries of hu man ac tions
Plant
Type of human failure event
Pre-accident Initiator Post-accident
Armenian 2 THERP[4, 5] ... (
***) HCR [6],ASEP
Bohunice V-1 THERP THERP, ASEP TRC, THERP
Bohunice V-2 THERP THERP, ASEP TRC, THERP 
Dukovany THERP
THERP,
CREAM [7],
HEART [8],
Decision trees
Decision trees
+ ASEP
Mochovce THERP,ASEP [9] THERP, ASEP SLIM [10]
Paks ASEP Decision trees Decision trees
Kozloduy
NPP Units 3,4 THERP
Information
not available HCR
***    Since the in for ma tion has been taken from full power PSA,
     no hu man in duced ini ti a tors were iden ti fied and no spe cific HRA
...method was deemed nec es sary there fore for this part of HRA
With ref er ence to tab. 2, the fol low ing con sid er -
ations emerge. A set of dif fer ent HRA quan ti fi ca tion
meth ods was used by the in di vid ual teams. In to tal
seven meth ods had been used, if it is con sid ered TRC
and HCR to be the same. The THERP method is the
most pop u lar in the con sid ered anal y ses; ASEP fol -
lows as sec ond. Be cause ASEP can be seen as a short -
ened and up-dated ver sion of THERP,  THERP/ASEP
were iden ti fied as the most used HRA meth ods for an -
a lyz ing hu man er rors oc cur ring in the pre-ac ci dent
phase. TRC (HCR) is the most pop u lar method for
post-ac ci dent hu man er rors anal y sis.
SPE CIFIC IN SIGHTS RE GARD ING
HRA IN LPSD PSA 
This sec tion is di vided into two parts. In the first
one, some gen eral com ments about LPSD HRA are
made. In the sec ond, some con clu sions are pre sented,
based on the anal y sis of the ques tion naires pro vided
by the teams in volved into the har mo ni za tion ef fort for 
the PSA for WWER plants.
Gen eral considerations on LPSD HRA
The first com ment stem ming from the work shop
is that the role of plant crew dur ing low power and
shut down op er a tion and, con se quently, the im por -
tance of HRA for the LPSD of an in te grated plant PSA
model is even higher than in case of full power op er a -
tion. This is sum ma rized in tab. 3, which shows the im -
por tance of dif fer ent types of hu man er rors.
The im por tance of hu man ac tions for LPSD PSA 
of WWER re ac tors can also be con sid ered with re -
spect to the plant crew role in the most fre quently an a -
lyzed LPSD ac ci dent sce nar ios. The high in volve ment 
of plant staff in these sce nar ios is pointed out by tab. 4.
The prob lem of LPSD HRA is that the en hanced
role of hu man fac tors in LPSD ac ci dent con di tions
can not be sup ported with ad e quately de vel oped spe -
cific HRA meth od ol o gies. The po ten tial of HRA
meth od ol o gies to ad e quately sup port the anal y sis of
spe cific types of hu man er rors is sum ma rized in tab. 5. 
Some other spe cific as pects of HRA anal y sis can 
be also in ferred by com par ing full power and LPSD
PSA. These com par i sons are sum ma rized in tab. 6.
The gen eral con di tions of crew work dur ing
plant LPSD sta tus have to be ad dressed ad e quately in
LPSD HRA. In tab. 7, an over view of ba sic cat e go ries
of plant states dur ing LPSD pe riod of op er a tion is
given. Dif fer ent Hu man Er ror Prob a bil i ties (HEPs)
are de rived for even the same hu man ac tions, when
car ried out un der the dif fer ent cir cum stances and dif -
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Ta ble 3. Im por tance of dif fer ent types of hu man errors
HE category Full power PSA Low power PSA
Pre-accident Low Low
Contributing to
initiating events Very low High
Post-accident High High
Recoveries Medium High
Ta ble 4. Hu man re lated sce nar ios con trib ut ing to the
ini ti at ing event oc cur rence dur ing LPSD op er a tion of
WWER reactors
Scenario
Plant crew role in
the initiation part of
the scenario
Plant crew role in
the response part of
the scenario
Interruption of
RHR circuit
coolant flow
Almost completely
caused by human
actions
Important
Drainage of RHR
circuit coolant
Almost completely
caused by human
actions
Important
Loss of natural
circulation due to
steam bubble
Partially Critical
Loss of natural
circulation due to
primary circuit
drainage
Completely caused
by human actions Important
Inadvertent closing 
of main isolation
valves
Completely caused
by human actions
Important, although
playing relatively
simple role
Man-induced
LOCA
Completely caused
by human actions Very important
Reactivity
transients
Depending on
cases, may be
crucial, may be
unimportant
Important
Primary circuit
cold
over-pressurization
Completely caused
by human actions Important
Ta ble 5. Po ten tial of cur rent meth od ol o gies for anal y sis
of hu man ac tion categories
Human failure type Full power PSA Low power PSA
Pre-accident Medium Medium
Contributing to
initiating events (IE) Almost irrelevant Medium
Post-accident Relatively high Relatively low
Recoveries Low to medium Unclear
Human failure type Full power PSA Low power PSA
Altogether Medium to high Low to medium
Ta ble 6. Some com par i sons be tween full power HRA and
shut down HRA attributes
Attribute Full power PSA Low power PSA
Dependence
analysis
Strong dependencies 
among human
actions in one
accident sequence
typical
Less strong
dependencies
(long time,
successive actions,
change of crew,
additional members
of accident team)
Errors
commission Potentially important Very important
Expert
judgment use Medium Medium to high
Revision phase Difficult Very difficult
Relative
uncertainty Medium High
fer ent plant states. The anal y sis of the most com mon
HRA meth ods may dif fer for full-power and LPSD
anal y sis sig nif i cantly. Some meth ods that are quite
suit able for full-power anal y sis may not ad dress LPSD 
con di tions suf fi ciently, whilst oth ers may pro vide sat -
is fac tory or good re sults. In ad di tion, in tab. 8, sev eral
com ments con cern ing the ap pli ca bil ity of dif fer ent
HRA meth ods for LPSD study are sum ma rized and re -
ferred to five typologies of hu man ac tions.
DIS CUS SION 
Some spe cific in sights re gard ing HRA in LPSD
PSA have been gained on the ba sis of com par i son of
the re sults re lated to hu man re li abil ity anal y sis pro -
vided by the in di vid ual plants in the ques tion naires
(see An nex III of ref. [1]). The com par i son of the ba sic
fea tures of HRA per formed within the in di vid ual
WWER PSA is given in tabs. 9 and 10, one ta ble for
WWER-440 re ac tors and the other for WWER-1000
re ac tors. The WWER-440 ta ble cov ers in for ma tion
about HRA for six NPPs; the WWER-1000 ta ble is de -
voted to HRA in for ma tion taken from five NPP. A few
plants did not pro vide de tailed in for ma tion, be cause it
was ei ther not avail able or the LPSD study was not fi -
nal ized yet.
In the ta bles, six se lected emer gency sce nar ios
are de fined, which were eval u ated as most im por tant
from the point of view of the LPSD PSA re sults con -
cern ing WWER re ac tors. Some of the sce nar ios are
the same for both types of re ac tors, some are dif fer ent.
Some sce nar ios had been found not to have sig nif i cant
im pact on the PSA re sults for spe cific plants, which as
a con se quence have not been cov ered with the cor re -
spond ing PSA. In this spe cific case, the note “not pro -
vided” or “screened out” is in serted in the ta bles.
Ev ery plant spe cific HRA in for ma tion con sists
of five items:
– “HEP range” – for ev ery sce nario, it is the range of 
HEP quan ti fy ing the hu man ac tions which are
mod eled as part of the tech no log i cal and or ga ni za -
tional pro cesses form ing the sce nario. This cou ple 
of pa ram e ters can give some in sights about the
con ser va tism of the HRA study un der con sid er -
ation. How ever the used HEP  can not be taken as
an  ab so lute in di ca tor, be cause the level of con ser -
va tism is re flected both in HEP val ues and in the
ap proach used in the de vel op ment of the sce nario
model,
– “HEP range typ i cal” – the ba sis for this pa ram e ter is 
given in the pre vi ous row, but some fairly ex cep -
tional HEP val ues, from the set of all HEP val ues
for the given sce nario, are not taken into con sid er -
ation. Some times, the “HEP range” pa ram e ter is
not a good re flec tion of the scope of most of the val -
ues, be cause there is a cou ple of non-typ i cal HEP
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Ta ble 7. Five ar eas of hu man ac tions in LPSD PSA
Area Conditions for crewwork From-to
Area 1 – Plant
within the early
stage of going to
shut down status
Similar or at least
similar to nominal
power, dynamic
changes in parameter 
values
From nominal
power operation to
initiation of residual
heat removal (RHR) 
cooling
Area 2 – Plant at 
the end stage of
going to shut
down status
Significantly
different from
nominal power,
dynamic changes,
short period
From initiation of
RHR cooling to start 
of reactor cover
removal
Area 3 –  Plant
within the first
part of shut
down
Shut down specifics,
medium dynamic,
relatively long period
From the start of
reactor cover
removal to the start
of fuel exchange
Area 4 – Plant in 
late shut down
Very long time
windows for crew
corrective actions,
low residual heat
From fuel exchange
to the start of unit
power-up
Area 5 – Plant
during start-up
Basically similar to
AREA 2, but specific 
features must be
addressed
From the start of
unit power-up to
niminal power
Ta ble 8. Com par i son of quan ti fi ca tion meth ods ap pli ca bil ity 
for full power and LPSD HRA
Method Conclusions
Absolute
probability
judgment
In LPSD PSA, the suitability of the method
is even higher, considering that the
application of “classic” methods may imply 
some problems
Time vs.
reliability
correlation
(HCR)
Limited applicability, particularly in shut
down scenarios. Often producing unrealistic 
and too low long time windows HEP
THERP, ASEP
Suitable for selected categories of actions,
similarly to full power PSA (actions
explicitly given in procedures, with low
level of cognition, or local actions)
Decision trees
Good applicability in general, but not a very 
good transferability from full power PSA.
Special decision trees may need to be
developed for LPSD PSA applications
HEART
Similarly to full power PSA, the method
may help in analyzing specific actions
difficult to be processed with other
methods. The method does should not be
used as standalone HRA method
Simulator data,
bayesian update
Limited applicability because a significant part
of initiating event response activities may be
performed out of the control room.
Consequently, many important crew tasks
related to low power operation and shut down
are not covered by the training at full scope
simular. The problem of simulator fidelity is
even higher in case of the LPSD status
Generic data
Very limited applicability due to the highly
plant specific character of measures
preventing and responding to LPSD PSA
accident scenarios
SLIM
Good applicability potential, provided that
the time related issues are treated
adequately. The method is one of the
available good choices for LPSD PSA
CREAM
Very helpful when the cognition part of
human actions must be taken into account
(e. g. for the circumstances when the
procedural support is missing and
improvisation needed). Good choice for full 
power as well as LPSD PSA
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Ta ble 9. Re sults of anal y sis of HRA re lated in for ma tion pro vided in the questionnares de vel oped for WWER-440 NPP
WWER-440
reactors
Scenario 1 – man
induced LOCA
(MIL)
Scenario 2 – loss
of operational
(non-essential)
service water
(LOSW)
Scenario 3 –
reactivity accidents
Scenario 4 –
loss of natural
circulation
Scenario 5 –
heavy load drops
Scenario 6 –
small LOCA
Plant 1
LPSD not finished yet
Plant 2
HEP range 5⋅10–5-1.4⋅10–2 5⋅10–5-2.5⋅10–2
Not provided
5⋅10–5-1.4⋅10–2
Not provided
5⋅10–5-5⋅10–2
HEP range
typical 5⋅10
–5-5⋅10–5 5⋅10–5-2.5⋅10–2 5⋅10–5-1.4⋅10–2 5⋅10–5-4⋅10–4
HE absolute
CDF 1.33⋅10
–6 5.1⋅10–7 1.43⋅10–6 5.1⋅10–8
HE relative
CDF 0.29 0.85 0.66 0.046
LER Not available Not available Not available Not available
Plant 3
HEP range 4⋅10–3-2×10–1
Screened out
4⋅10–3-6×10–2 8⋅10–4-2×10–1 4⋅10–6-5×10–6 2.5⋅10–3-3×10–1
HEP range
typical 1⋅10
–2-7⋅10–2 1⋅10–2-6×10–2 5⋅10–3-8×10–2 4⋅10–6-5×10–6 1.75⋅10–2-1×10–1
HE absolute
CDF 1.7⋅10
–6 8.5⋅10–8 8.5⋅10–6 6.8⋅10–6 5.17⋅10–6
HE relative
CDF 1 1 1 0.89 0.99
LER 0.59 0.84 0.90 0.86 1
Plant 4
Information not provided
Plant 5
HEP range 2.5⋅10–5-5×10–1
Screened out
8.36⋅10–6-1.83×10–3 5.27⋅10–4-4.35×10–1 3⋅10–2-6.59×10–1 4⋅10–3-2×10–1
HEP range
typical 2.5⋅10
–5-5.6×10–2 8.36⋅10–6-1.20×10–4 2.0⋅10–3-4.35×10–1 3⋅10–2-2.64×10–1 4⋅10–3-2.64×10–1
HE absolute
CDF 6.48⋅10
–7 1.7⋅10–6 1.70⋅10–7 1.95⋅10–8 1.34⋅10–8
HE relative
CDF 0.96 1 1 0.07 0.955
LER 0.3 0.98 0.62 0.91 0.29
Plant 6
HEP range 1.2⋅10–4-1.2×10–4 1.2⋅10–4-5×10–1 1⋅10–5-1 1.2⋅10–4-3.6×10–3
Not analyzed
1.18⋅10–4
HEP range
typical 1.2⋅10
–4-1.2×10–4 1.2⋅10–4-5×10–3 1⋅10–5, 1.44×10–1 1.2⋅10–4-2.6×10–4 1.18⋅10–4
HE absolute
CDF 5.86⋅10
–6 1.7⋅10–6 2.97⋅10–7 1.05⋅10–5 6.11⋅10–10
HE relative
CDF 0.108 0.49 0.996 0.87 0.009
LER 0.63 0.71 0.96 0.96 0.88
Plant 7
HEP range 2.1⋅10–5-5×10–2
Screened out
1⋅10–5-1 1⋅10–5-1×10–5
Not analyzed
1⋅10–5-5.2×10–5
HEP range
typical 5.9⋅10
–4-5×10–2 1⋅10–5-5×10–2 1⋅10–5-1×10–5 1⋅10–5-5.2×10–5
HE absolute
CDF Not at disposal 1.38⋅10
–6 1.1⋅10–7 Negligible
HE relative
CDF Not at disposal 1 0.079 Close to 0
LER 0.42 Not at disposal 0.89 0.013
Plant 8
HEP range 4.12⋅10–4-2×10–2 2.5⋅10–5-1.8×10–2 2.5⋅10–4-6.34×10–3 1.39⋅10–4-2.6×10–3 To be specified 4.92⋅10–4
HEP range
typical 4.12⋅10
–4-2×10–2 1.16⋅10–3-1.8×10–2 2.5⋅10–4-6.34×10–3 1.39⋅10–4-2.6×10–3 To be specified 4.92⋅10–4
HE absolute
CDF 2.71⋅10
–6 1.77⋅10–8 1.16⋅10–9 2.21⋅10–6-1.19×10–8 To be specified 2.4⋅10–9
HE relative
CDF 1 0.48 1 0.99 To be specified 0.13
LER 0.996 1 0.94 1, 1 To be specified 0.69
val ues fall ing sig nif i cantly out of the “nor mal
range”. The aim of the “HEP range typ i cal” is to
elim i nate these “re mote ob ser va tions” and to get
more pre cise pat tern of the HEPs used,
– “HE ab so lute core damage frequency (CDF)” – To -
tal con tri bu tion of fre quen cies of all those min i -
mum cut sets (MCS), be long ing to the given sce -
nario of the PSA model that con tains the ba sic event 
rep re sent ing the hu man fail ure in ques tion. This in -
for ma tion is suit able for com par i son of ab so lute
im pact of hu man-fac tor is sues spe cific for the
given sce nario on the eval u ated risk,
– “HE rel a tive CDF” – rel a tive con tri bu tion of fre -
quen cies of all those min i mum cut sets (be long ing
to the given sce nario PSA model) that con tain fail -
ure of some hu man ac tions, i. e. to tal con tri bu tion
of the hu man er ror (HE) ab so lute CDF di vided by
the to tal sum of the first twenty MCS CDF con tri -
bu tions. In this way it is pos si ble to see which part
of risk con nected with se lected sce nario has some
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Ta ble 10. Re sults of anal y sis of HRA re lated in for ma tion pro vided in the ques tion naires de vel oped for WWER-1000 NPP
WWER-1000 
reactors
Scenario 1 – loss
of offsite power
Scenario 2 – heavy 
load drops
Scenario 3 –
primary circuit
leaks outside
containment
Scenario 4 –
small LOCA
primary to
secondary
Scenario 5 –
loss of heat
removal via
primary side
Scenario 6 –
pressurizer safety
valve (PSV) primary 
leaks during
hydro-test
Plant 9
HEP range 8⋅10–3-1.6×10–1
Not analyzed
1⋅10–5-1.3×10–3 2.7⋅104-1.6×10–2 2.13⋅10–4-2.3×10–2
Not considered
HEP range
typical 8⋅10
–3-1.6×10–1 8⋅10–4-1.3×10–3 2.7⋅104-1.6×10–2 8⋅10–3-2.3×10–2
HE absolute
CDF 1.06⋅10
–6 1.26⋅10–6 1.03⋅10–6 2.74⋅10–6
HE relative
CDF 0.22 1 1 0.36
LER 0.39 0.81 0.8 0.29
Plant 10
Information not provided
Plant 11
HEP range No HE No HE 1⋅10–3 1⋅10–4-2×10–3 1⋅10–4-1×10–4 No HE
HEP range
typical No HE No HE 1⋅10
–3 5⋅10–4-2×10–3 1⋅10–4-1×10–4 No HE
HE absolute
CDF 0 0 4.89⋅10
–12 6.9⋅10–8 3.7⋅10–7 0
HE relative
CDF 0 0 0.82 0.98 0.31 0
LER 1 1 1 1 0.6 1
Plant 12
HEP range 6.2⋅10–4-8.8×10–2 No HE 2.4⋅10–2-2.4×10–2 1⋅10–4-4.86×10–2 No HE 1.4⋅10–3-3.7×10–3
HEP range
typical 1.2⋅10
–3-6.6×10–2 No HE 2.4⋅10–2-2.4×10–2 1.9⋅10–3-4.86×10–2 No HE 1.4⋅10–3-3.7×10–3
HE absolute
CDF 3.06⋅10
–6 0 2.43×10–6 7.8⋅10–8 0 1.9⋅10–8
HE relative
CDF 0.24 0 0.66 1 0 0.02
LER 0.33 1 0.91 0.99 1 0.97
Plant 13
HEP range 2.3⋅10–3-2.9×10–2 6.8⋅10–3-1.5×10–2 4⋅10–3-1.5×10–1 2.4⋅10–3-1.5×10–1 4.8⋅10–3-1.2×10–2 6.8⋅10–3-2.9×10–2
HEP range
typical 2.3⋅10
–3-2.9×10–2 6.8⋅10–3-1.5×10–2 4⋅10–3-4.9×10–2 2.4⋅10–3-6.8×10–2 4.8⋅10–3-6.8×10–3 6.8⋅10–3-1.5×10–2
HE absolute
CDF 6.3×10
–8 9.4×10–6 1.37⋅10–6 3⋅10–6 1.7×10–6 1.07×10–5
HE relative
CDF 0.14 0.96 1 1 1 1
LER 0.21 0.94 0.96 0.21 1 1
Plant 14
HEP range 1.5⋅10–2-1.5×10–2 2.3⋅10–3-1.5×10–2 2.4⋅10–3-1.5×10–1 4⋅10–3-1.5×10–1 6.7⋅10–4-1.5×10–2 2.35⋅10–3-2.86×10–2
HEP range
typical 1.5⋅10
–2-1.5×10–2 2.3⋅10–3-1.5×10–2 2.4⋅10–3-4.9×10–2 4⋅10–3-1.5×10–1 1.2⋅10–2-1.5×10–2 2.35⋅10–3-2.86×10–2
HE absolute
CDF 1.26×10
–7 5.26×10–6 1.09×10–5 1.11×10–5 2.06×10–7 7.66×10–6
HE relative
CDF 0.15 0.91 1 1 1 0.99
LER 0.4 0.55 0.78 0.79 0.15 0.98
re la tion with hu man fac tor prob lems: small val ues
of this pa ram e ter in di cate that the re sponse to the
given ini ti at ing event is per formed mostly au to mat -
i cally, with out in volve ment of plant crew (what
should not be the case for WWER NPP), and
– “Level or rep re sen ta tive ness (LER)” – to tal con tri -
bu tion to CDF com ing from the first twenty MCS
re lated to the given sce nario di vided by the to tal
CDF value de rived for the sce nario (com ing from
“all” sce nario MCS). LER shows, how much rep re -
sen ta tive are the pre vi ous re sults pre sented in the
ta ble, ob tained on the base of the twenty most im -
por tant min i mum cut sets only, if the value is close
to 1, where the first twenty MCS rep re sent al most
all the sce nario risk.
A large quan tity of in for ma tion is pre sented in
the ta bles. For the in di vid ual at trib utes, the range val -
ues are the fol low ing:
HEP range val ues
– ex tremely low – of mag ni tude 10–6
– very low – of mag ni tude 10–5
– low – of mag ni tude 10–4
– me dium – of mag ni tude 10–3
– fairly high – of mag ni tude 10–2
– very high – of mag ni tude 10–1
Note 1: Low HEP val ues are de sir able, high val -
ues un de sir able. How ever, low HEP val ues may also
be due to the pres ence of some bias in the anal y sis. 
HE ab so lute CDF
– very low – of mag ni tude 10–8 and lower
– low – of mag ni tude 10–7
– me dium – of mag ni tude 10–6
– high – of mag ni tude 10–5 and higher
Note 1 holds for this case, as well.
HE rel a tive CDF
– very low – lower than or equal to 0.1
– low – from the in ter val (0.1, 0.4>)
– me dium – from the in ter val (0.4, 0.7>)
– high – from the in ter val (0.7, 1>)
Note 2: High val ues of this pa ram e ter are ex -
pected, low val ues are seen as ab nor mal.
LER
The same rules are used as for “HE rel a tive
CDF” at trib ute.
Note 3: High val ues of this pa ram e ter in di cate
higher cred i bil ity of anal y sis re sults and vice versa.
Us ing tabs. 9 and 10, two kinds of use ful com -
par i sons can be ba si cally made:
– the com par i son of the pa ram e ters be tween dif fer -
ent plants for the same sce nario, and
– the com par i son of the pa ram e ters  be tween dif fer -
ent sce nar ios for the same plant.
The fol low ing con clu sions can be made on the
ba sis of the ta ble for the LPSD HRA (across sce nar ios) 
for the in di vid ual WWER-440 plants:
– the HEP val ues used in Plant 2 PSA are the most
op ti mis tic ones among all the val ues pro vided by
the plants; in gen eral, the risk con tri bu tion for hu -
man fac tors re lated is sues is rel a tively low and a
rel a tively sig nif i cant part of MCS (for most of the
sce nar ios) does not con tain hu man fail ures,
– the HEP range typ i cal for Plant 3 NPP HRA is
rather con ser va tive, ex cept for heavy load drops,
whilst  the rel a tive part of risk con tri bu tion con -
nected with sce nario seg ments con trolled with hu -
man ac tions is rather high,
– some HEP val ues used in Plant 5 HRA are highly
con ser va tive, but still ad e quate, be cause the level
of risk con tri bu tion re lated to hu man fac tors  is
quite low in those cases; the rel a tive con tri bu tion
to the risk level ex pected to be high (big in flu ence
of hu man fac tor) with an ex cep tion re gard ing
heavy load drops,
– the HEP val ues in Plant 6 PSA study are rel a tively
low in most sce nar ios taken into con sid er ation;
how ever, the ab so lute hu man re lated risk con tri -
bu tion is fairly high in sev eral sce nar ios an a lyzed;
a very low (both ab so lute and rel a tive) con tri bu -
tion of hu man ac tions is typ i cal for small LOCA
sce nar ios,
– for Plant 7, the con clu sions re gard ing HEPs
ranges and hu man fac tor ab so lute con tri bu tion to
the risk con nected with the sce nar ios un der con -
cern are quite close to the con clu sions made for
Plant 6, with one sig nif i cant dif fer ence in the
value of rel a tive con tri bu tion of hu man re lated
seg ments to the sce nario “Loss of nat u ral cir cu la -
tion”, and
– in the LPSD PSA of Plant 8 some HEP ranges are
ex pected in typ i cal up-to-date PSA; some ranges
are rel a tively low, lead ing to lower to tal con tri bu -
tion of the cor re spond ing sce nar ios to LPSD op er -
a tion risk; the val ues of rel a tive hu man re lated
con tri bu tors are rather close to unity, which points
out the high rel e vance of hu man fac tors in the sce -
nar ios, with an ex cep tion in the case of small
LOCA.
For the HRA de vel oped for plants with
WWER-1000 re ac tors, the fol low ing gen eral con clu -
sions are made:
– rather con ser va tive HEP val ues are used in gen -
eral for Plant 9 HRA, lead ing to rel a tive bal anced,
sig nif i cant to tal con tri bu tions of hu man parts of
all se lected sce nar ios to plant risk; however, the
rel a tive hu man re lated con tri bu tions are small for
the sce nar ios “loss of off-site power” and “loss of
heat re moval”,
– in the case of Plant 11, the HEP val ues used are
rather op ti mis tic (typ i cal val ues which can be used 
for lon ger time win dows), but the ab so lute hu man
re lated con tri bu tions to plant risk have been found 
to be very low; because the rel a tive weight of
these con tri bu tors was spec i fied as high, the rea -
son can not be in com plete ness of hu man fac tor
part in the mod el ing; moreover, it is worth to men -
G. Manna, et al.: Hu man Re li abil ity Anal y sis in Low Power and Shut-down ...
Nu clear Tech nol ogy & Ra di a tion Pro tec tion: Year 2012, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 189-197 195
tion that the in for ma tion was pro vided only for
half of the sce nar ios,
– rather high HEP are used in gen eral in Plant 12 
HRA, but still keep ing low the val ues of most of
the con tri bu tions of hu man re lated MCS,
– in Plant 13  HRA, the val ues of HEP are very high
and the val ues of ab so lute and rel a tive con tri bu -
tion of hu man re lated parts of the in di vid ual sce -
nar ios to plant risk are – prob a bly as a di rect con -
se quence – rather high as well. The only ex cep tion 
is the sce nario “loss of off-site power” with high
HEP val ues, but a quite low to tal as well as rel a tive 
con tri bu tion to plant LPSD risk, and
– fi nally, for Plant 14 HRA, a very sim i lar spec trum of
pa ram e ter val ues can be found as for Plant 13 HRA,
and, con se quently, very sim i lar con clu sions can be
made about the level of con ser va tive ness as well as
of hu man re li abil ity im por tance for PSA re sults.
CON CLU SIONS
The fol low ing con clu sions stem from com par i -
sons from the point of view of the in di vid ual sce nar ios
across plants.
• In gen eral, it is dif fi cult to iden tify some spe cific
fea tures of the in di vid ual sce nar ios re gard ing
HEP val ues used in cor re spond ing HRA. The
whole spec trum of HEP ranges can be usu ally
iden ti fied across plants, some ex cep tion from this
con clu sion are noted for the WWER-1000 sce nar -
ios “Loss of heat re moval via pri mary side” and
“PSV pri mary leaks dur ing hy dro-test”, where
lower HEP val ues sig nif i cantly pre vail.
• Man-in duced LOCA in op er a tion of WWER-440
re ac tors is the only sce nario show ing a rel a tively
good agree ment among the to tal val ues of ab so -
lute hu man re lated CDF con tri bu tions de rived in
the in di vid ual stud ies; some level of agree ment
can be found also in case of WWER-1000 sce -
nario “Loss of heat re moval via pri mary side”.
• The WWER-440 sce nario “Re ac tiv ity ac ci dents” is
typ i cal with very high level of hu man fac tor in volve -
ment into the most im por tant MCS, which is very
close to unity or even equal to unity in most cases.
• The WWER-440 “Small LOCA” sce nario shows
in sev eral cases rel a tively low hu man fac tor con -
tri bu tion to the risk of twenty of the most im por -
tant min i mum cut sets.
• Low rel a tive con tri bu tion to CDF is typ i cal for the
hu man role in the WWER-1000 sce nario “Loss of
off-site power”; the level of agree ment among the
val ues pre sented in the ta ble for the in di vid ual
PSAs is sur pris ingly high.
• In the WWER-1000 sce nar ios “Pri mary cir cuit
leaks out side con tain ment” and “Small LOCA
from pri mary to sec ond ary cir cuit”, a very high
por tion of MCS in cludes pri mary events con tain -
ing hu man ac tions, i. e. hu man in volve ment is a
sub stan tial con trib u tor to the risk pro file.
In gen eral, it can be ob served that the HEP val -
ues ranges ex plored in the WWER LPSD stud ies pre -
sented in the har mo ni za tion ef fort, are driven by the
dif fer ences among HRA ap proaches much more than
by the dif fer ences among the in di vid ual sce nar ios.
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ANALIZA  POUZDANOSTI  OSOBQA  U  OKVIRU  PROBABILISTI^KE
OCENE  SIGURNOSTI  NUKLEARNIH  POSTROJEWA  U  RE@IMU
MALIH  SNAGA  I  STAJAWA  VAN  POGONA
– Rezultati  jedne  me|unarodne  inicijative –
Od samog po~etka ere kori{}ewa nuklearne energije, qudski faktor je razmatran kao
jedan od kqu~nih aspekata u svim fazama ` ivotnog ciklusa nuklearnog postrojewa: u projektovawu, 
pu{tawu u pogon, tokom pogona, odr`avawa, nadzora, pogonskih izmena i dekomisije. Ovakav stav
stalno se potvr|uje iskustvima iz prakse. Me|unarodna agencija za atomsku energiju i Udru`eni
istra`iva~ki centar Evropske komisije organizovali su radionicu na temu harmonizacije
probabilisti~kih analiza sigurnosti u re`imu malih snaga i stajawa van pogona za nuklearne
elektrane WWER tipa. Jedan od glavnih ciqeva radionice bio je da se izvr{i pore|ewe
razli~itih pristupa i rezultata analiza pouzdanosti osobqa kod nuklearnih elektrana tipa
WWER 440 i WWER 1000 i da se stekne uvid u budu}e primene analiza pouzdanosti osobqa u
razmatrawu scenarija u re`imu malih snaga i stajawa van pogona. Ovaj rad sumira aktivnosti i
zakqu~ke pomenute radionice koji se odnose na analize pouzdanosti osobqa i qudskog faktora.
Kqu~ne re~i: probabilisti~ka analiza sigurnosti, re`im malih snaga i stajawa van pogona,
.........................analiza pouzdanosti osobqa, WWER, qudski faktor
